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NOTES
Bank ofAmerica v. 203
North LaSalle Street Partnership:
Cram Down without Debtor ExclusivityGood or Bad for the Creditor?
BY ANN E. NOLAN*
1
"Unfortunately, the approach taken today only thickens the fog."

N

INTRODUCTION

ferthe Supreme Court handed downBankofAmericaNational

& Savings Ass n v. 203 North LaSalle Street
J
artnership1 on May 3, 1999, one might ask ifthere will ever
be an answer to the long-debated issue of whether there is a "new value
exception 3 or "new value corollary" 4 to the absolute priority rule in
1Trust

"J.D. expected 2001, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank
Professor Christopher Frost for his guidance throughout the process of writing this
Note and her husband for his support and encouragement.
' Bank ofAm. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434, 463 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the effect that the majority
will have on Chapter 11 cram down reorganizations).
opinion
2 1d.
at 434.
3 The "new value exception" to the absolute priority rule is derived from preCode case law thatpermitted continued participation by pre-petition equity holders
if their contribution was in money or money's worth, reasonably equivalent to their
continued participation. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.04[4][c][i][A]
(15th ed. rev. 1996).
4The "new value corollary" is derived from the argument that new value is not
logically distinct from absolute priority. See id. 1129.04[4][c][i][B].
5 The "absolute priority rule" is the general rule that in a distribution of the
assets of a corporation, senior claims or interests have priority over junior claims

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 89

Chapter 11 cram downs.6 LaSalle is the secondtime that the Supreme Court
has addressed the new value controversy,7 and again the Court has failed
to provide a definitive answer as to whether or not this doctrine survived
the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code ("the Code"). 8
Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) 9 of the Code sets forth what has come to
be called the absolute priority rule. 10 This section permits the cram down
of a plan in Chapter 11 reorganizations over a dissenting class of impaired unsecured creditors only if their claims are paid in full, or the prepetition equity holders will not receive or retain any property on account
of their prior interest in the debtor." Creditors often oppose cram down
actions by asserting that the absolute priority rule is violated if the
proposed plan allows pre-petition equity owners to retain ownership of the
debtor. Pre-petition equity holders respond with the argument that there
is a "new value exception" or "new value corollary" to the absolute
priority rule that permits them to retain ownership by contributing new
2
capital.'
This was exactly the posture ofthe debate inLaSalle.Bank of America
National Trust and Savings Association ("Bank") made a loan of $93
million to the 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership ("Partnership"), secured
by a nonrecourse first mortgage on fifteen floors of an office building in
or interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
6"CramDown"permits confirmation ofaplan notwithstanding non-acceptance
by an impaired class of creditors or equity security holders under Chapter 11. See
id. § 1129(b)(1).
I Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203 n.3 (1988)
(assuming without deciding that the new value doctrine survived enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code).
I Bank of Am.Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434, 454 (1999) (assuming that even if the new value doctrine still exists, the plan
at issue would have to be rejected).
9 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
' SeeBruce A. Markell, OwnersAuctions, andAbsolutePriorityinBankitiptcy
Reorganizations,44 STAN. L. REV. 69,88-90 (1991) (describing the process ofthe
codification of the absolute priority rule); supra note 5 (defining the absolute
priority rule).
S111 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that aplan is fair and equitable and
will be confirmed with respect to a class of unsecured claims if"the holder of any
claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such [impaired] class will not receive
or retain under the plan on account of suchjunior claim or interest any property").
,2 See infra Part L.A (discussing the origins of the "new value exception" and
"new value corollary").
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Chicago.13 After defaulting on the loan, the Debtor filed for relief under
itself from a foreclosure action that the Bank brought
Chapter 11 to1protect
in state court. 4
Since the value of the Bank's security was less than the outstanding
balance on the mortgage, the bank chose to divide its claim into a secured
claim based on the value of the property and an unsecured claim for the
remaining deficiency. 5 During the exclusivityperiod,"' the debtorproposed
a plan with the following features:
(1) The Bank's $54.5 million secured claim would be paid in full
between 7 and 10 years after the original 1995 repayment date.
(2) The Bank's $38.5 million unsecured deficiency claim would be
discharged for an estimated 16% of its present value.
(3) The remaining unsecured claims of $90,000, held by the outside
trade creditors, would be paid in full, without interest, on the effective
date of the plan.
(4) Certain former partners of the Debtor would contribute $6.125
million innew capital over the course offiveyears (the contribution being
worth some $4.1 million in present value), in exchange for the Partner17
ship's entire ownership of the reorganized debtor.
In response to this new value plan, the Bank attempted to block
confirmation by objecting.18 The Court imposed the plan on the Bank using
the judicial cram down.19 The Bank took the position that the plan could not
be confirmed as a cram down because it violated the absolute priority rule

1In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 126 F.3d 955,958 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'dsub
nom. Bank ofAm. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'nv. 203 N. LaSalleP'ship, 526 U.S. 434
(1999).
14Id.

"1Id.The Bankwas able to divide these claims based on § 506(a) and § 111 1(b)
of the Code. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 111(b).
1611 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (allowing debtorexclusive opportunity to propose aplan
during a period of 120 days).
17 Bank ofAm. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St P'ship, 526 U.S.
434, 440 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 440-41. The Bank was able to block consensual confirmation of the
proposed plan as sole member of an impaired class of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(8).
19 LaSalle,526 U.S. at 441. The debtor used the process as set out in § 1129(b)
to impose a cram down. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b); supra note 6 (defining
judicial cram down).
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by allowing pre-petition equity holders to retain ownership of the
partnership without paying the Bank's unsecured deficiency interest in
fall.20 The bankruptcy court approved the plan over the Bank's objection and dismissed the Bank's motion to convert to a Chapter 7 or,
alternatively, to dismiss the case.21 Both the district court and the court of
appeals affirmed this decision, and the Bank appealed to the Supreme
Court? 2
Both the Petitioner's Briefs and the Respondent's Brief 24 to the
Supreme Court focused on whether or not pre-petition equity holders could
contribute new capital to the reorganization of the Debtor and retain an
equity interest in light of the absolute priority rule. The Petitioner argued:
Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) provides, in no uncertain terms, that the
absolute priority rule is, in fact, to be absolute: junior classes (such as
existing stockholders) are not to receive "any property" under a plan of
reorganization "on account of" their pre-bankruptcy interests until senior
classes of unsecured creditors are provided for in full. An option to
become an owner of a business enterprise is undoubtedly "property," a
term that is defined broadly in the Code. And that property is received "on
account of" a prior interest when, as in this case, a plan gives prebankruptcy equity holders an exclusive opportunity to obtain a stake in
the reorganized debtor-everyone except the prior equity owners is
disqualified from having an opportunity to invest in the post-bankruptcy
enterprise.
The broad language that Section 1129(b) uses in stating the absolute
priority rule is not limited or qualified anywhere in the Code. Most
importantly for purposes of this case, the Code does not contain a single
reference to a new value exception. Congress listed the ways in which a
plan can be crammed down on unconsenting creditors, but a new value
exception is not among them. 5
The Respondent countered with the following argument:
2 0LaSalle, 526

U.S. at 441-42.

21

Id. at442.

22Id.

' Brief for the Petitioner, Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999) (No. 97-1418).
24 Brief for Respondent, LaSalle (No. 97-1418).
z Brief for the Petitioner at 12, LaSalle (No. 97-1418).
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The Plan in this case satisfied the plain language of Section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). That section provides that the holder of a junior claim
or interest may not, over the dissent of a class of senior interests, "receive
or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any
property." This is the so-called absolute priority rule and its new value
corollary. By its very terms, Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) does not prohibit
a reorganization plan from providing that the holders of junior interests--such as the Investors here-purchase an interest in the reorganized
entity. The absolute priority rule states only that if a senior class dissents,
the owners may not receive this interest "on account of" their junior
interests.
Here, the Investors did not receive any property under the plan "on
account of"their junior interest in the debtor. They received their interest
in Reorganized LaSalle "on account of'--that is, in exchange for-their
payment of $6.125 million in cash.26
The Supreme Court held that the determination of the new value
doctrine was "not to be decided here" 27 but went on to find that "assuming
a new value corollary,... plans providing junior interest holders with
exclusive opportunities free from competition and without benefit of
market valuation fall within the prohibition of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)." The
Court then identified an unresolved issue, stating that "[w]hether a market
test would require an opportunity to offer competing plans or would be
satisfied by a right to bid for the same interest sought by old equity is a
question we do not decide here."2 9
At first blush, it would appear that the Supreme Court's decision in
LaSalle bolsters the rights of creditors by both eliminating exclusivity
when new value plans are proposed and requiring some type ofmarket test
to ensure that full value is paid for the right to participate in the reorganization ofthe debtor.30 It is important to remember, however, that the Supreme
Court did not specifically prohibit pre-petition equity holders from
participating in new value plans.3' Rather, the court implied that under
26 Brief for Respondent

at 8, LaSalle (No. 97-1418).

2

7LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 454.
28Id. at 458.
29
I.
3oSee, e.g.,

Robert S. Greenberger, CreditorRights in Realty Reorganizations
Aided, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1999, atB14 (concluding that creditors are in abetter
bargaining position after this decision).
3 See, e.g., George
H. Singer, Supreme Court Clarifies "New Value Exception"
to Absolute PriorityRule-or Does It?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 1999, at

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 89

certain situations when a market test is employed, a new value plan might
be approved and crammed down on dissenting unsecured creditors?' It is
difficult to predict how bankruptcy courts will apply the LaSalle decision
without resolution of the new value problem.3 Therefore, in order to
determine how this decision affects creditors, it is necessary to look more
closely at how courts might handle Chapter 11 cram downs after LaSalle.
This Note examines whether the LaSalle decision ultimately benefits
the creditor in a Chapter 11 cram down. Part I details the history of the new
value debate and the resulting circuit split, which the Supreme Court has
failed to resolve 4 Part II examines the recent Supreme Court decision,
LaSalle, and its influence on the current new value debate and future
Chapter 11 reorganizations.35 Part I looks closely at the effect of
plans and
removing exclusivity from the cram down process for new value
36
how this benefits or hinders the dissenting unsecured creditor.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEW VALUE DEBATE
AND RECENT JURISPRUDENCE

37

A. The HistoricalBackgroundofthe Absolute PriorityRule and the New
Value Doctrine
The absolute priority rule currently codified in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) 8has
a long history. The rule can be traced from the general "fair and equitable"
requirement in Chapter X ofthe Bankruptcy Ac 9 to Chapter X's predecessor, section 77B.' In turn, the origins of both provisions can be traced to
32.
32 See, e.g.,

id.
See id. at 47.
1 See infra notes 37-72 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 73-103 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 104-90 and accompanying text.

33

37

This section concerning the historical roots of the new value debate and its

impact on judicial decisions is by no means intended to be dispositive. This brief
discussion is merely intended to review for the reader the events leading up to the
LaSalle decision.
38 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994); seesupranotes 5,11 (defining absolute

priority).
19 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 621(2), 52 Stat. 883, 897 (1938)
(repealed 1979).
4OBankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 205,49 Stat. 911,919 (1935) (repealed

1938).
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the "fair and equitable" standard set out by the Supreme Court to deal with
railroad insolvencies4 1 in cases such as NorthernPacific RailroadCo. v.
Boyd,42
This common law standard was developed to address abuses that
emerged in the railroad reorganizations handled by federal equity
receiverships 3 Alliances wouldoftenbe formedbetween stockholders and
bondholders to wipe out junior and unsecured claims. The stockholder
would agree to seek an equity receivership while permitting the bondholders to foreclose. 45 The end result was an elimination of all junior and
unsecured claims.' A new company would then be formed with the same
stockholders, bondholders and property, less only the junior andunsecured
debt.47 By requiring that senior claims be paid before any junior claims or
interests, the absolute priority rule was designed to preserve the legal
priorities between senior and junior claims throughout the reorganization
process.4
As construed under the Bankruptcy Act, the absolute priority rule was
never intended to be an absolute prohibition to pre-petition equity holders'
participation in the reorganized debtor. In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
ProductsCo.,49 the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is, of course, clear that
41See

Markell, supra note 10, at 74-83 (discussing the early origins of the
absolute priority rule and the impact of N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482
(1913)).
42
Boyd, 228 U.S. at 482.
If the value of the [reorganization] road justified the issuance of stock in
exchange for old shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of that
value, whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for
purposes of control. In either event it was a right of property out of which
the creditors were entitled to be paid before the stockholders could retain it
for any purpose whatsoever.
Id. at 508.
43See Jeffrey Stem, Note, Failed
MarketsandFailedSolutions: The Unwitting
Formulationofthe CorporateReorganizationTechnique, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 783,
786-91 (1990) (explaining the equity receivership process in railroad
reorganizations).
"Markell,
supranote 10, at 76.
4
SId.

4Id.
47Id
.
4'G. Eric

Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the
BroaderImplicationsofthe Supreme Court'sAnalysis in Bank of America v. 203
North LaSalle Street Partnership, 54 Bus. LAW. 1475, 1497-98 & n.75 (1999).
" Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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there are circumstances under which stockholders may participate in a plan
of reorganization of an insolvent debtor." 0 The Court provided further
guidance as to when pre-petition equity holders should be permitted to
participate, stating that "[w]here... necessity exists and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution and receive in return a participation
reasonably equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made." 5'
The Court further required that "the stockholder's participation must be
based on a contribution in money or in money's worth, reasonably
equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of the
52
stockholder."
Subsequent courts have distilled the limitations of the new value
doctrine into a five part test: in order for pre-petition equity holders to
participate in the new ownership structure over the objection of creditors
not paid in full, the equity holders must provide capital contributions that
are (1) new, (2) substantial, (3) in the form of money or money's worth, (4)
reasonably equivalent to
necessary for a successful reorganization, and (5)
53
the interest obtained.
The question now is whether the new value doctrine survived
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code by Congress in 1978.1 Although the
absolute priority rule was incorporated into the Code, there was no explicit
reference to the judicially created new value exception. Some scholars
argue that the new value doctrine is nothing more than a restatement ofthe
absolute priority rule.55 Others note that pre-Code cases may have created
a new value exception that did not survive enactment of the Code because
it was not specifically codified.56

50Id.
at
51Id.

121.

52 Id. at 122.
1 See Bonner Mall P'ship v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall
P'ship), 2 F.3d 899, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1993), vacaturdenied andappeal dismissed
as moot, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
54 It is outside the scope of this Note to detail the raging debate concerning
whether or not the new value doctrine is an exception or a corollary to the absolute
priority rule. Many scholarly commentaries provide in-depth analysis on each side
of the issue. See sources cited infra notes 55-56.
5 See, e.g., Markell, supra note 10, at 96-102 (explaining the equivalence
between the absolute priority rule and the new value corollary, therefore, justifying
the corollary's existence after codification ofthe absolute priority rule in the Code).
56 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & John J. Rapisardi, Separateand Unequal: The
Seventh CircuitIsolatesandNeutralizesthe UndersecuredCreditorin In re 203 N.
LaSalle Street Partnership, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 667, 681-82 (1998).
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These two basic theories created the subsequent circuit split after
enactment of the Code. The next section briefly describes how the circuits
have addressed the issue of the new value d6ctrine and the Supreme
Court's unsuccessful attempts to resolve the issue prior to LaSalle.
B. The Supreme Court's Unsuccessful Attempts to Resolve the Circuit
Split
The Supreme Court specifically granted certiorari inLaSalletoresolve
a circuit split on the new value issue.' Unfortunately, the Court did not
carry out its intended purpose. 8 Therefore, it is important to briefly
examine how each circuit has resolved this issue.
Much of the current debate surrounding the new value doctrine
originated from the Supreme Court's decision in Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers.59 The issue that the Court faced in this case was
whether a farmer could retain his farm by contributing "labor, experience, and expertise" in satisfaction of the new value doctrine without
paying the full amount of the bank debt ° The Court chose not to accept the
Solicitor General's argument that the new value doctrine had not survived
enactment of the Code. 6' Rather, the Court assumed without deciding that
the doctrine had survived and that the plan in question did not satisfy the
doctrine's requirements.62 It appears that "the Court rendered judgment
with an opinion which purports to add nothing to the law as it has been
understood for fifty years."'63 Therefore, this decision left it for the courts
to continue the debate as to whether there is a new value doctrine still in
force.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In re 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnership' joined the Ninth Circuit in Bonner Mall

57 Bank

ofAm. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'nv. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434,443 (1999).
58 Id.
59Norwest Bank

60 Id. at 199.

Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).

61See id. at 203 n.3.
62 Id.
63 John

D. Ayer, RethinkingAbsolute PriorityAfter Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV.
963, 964 (1989).
"In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'dsub nom.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle P'ship, 526 U.S. 434
(1999).
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Partnershipv. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership)6" in finding that the new value exception had survived enactment of
the 1978 Code. Both courts held that a proposed plan would not violate the
absolute priority rule if the former equity owners were required to offer
value that was new, substantial, money or money's worth, necessary for
successful reorganization, and reasonably equivalent to value or interest
received.m
In contrast, both the Fourth and Second Circuits have failed to
explicitly address the existence of the new value doctrine. In Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Bryson Properties, XVIII (In re Bryson Properties,
XV!/), 6 7 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied cram down of
a plan which permitted limited partners the exclusive right to contribute
and recover new capital.68 The court assumed, but did not decide, that a
new value doctrine existed.69 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in ColtexLoop CentralThree Partnersv. BT/SAP Pool CAssociates (In re
Coltex Loop Central Three Partners)0 proceeded without providing any
answer as to the new value issue.7 The court concluded that even if the
traditional new value doctrine had survived, the plan could not be
confirmed because the partners avoided any type of market test, and thus
received a bargain by virtue of their previous position.'
It is clear from these examples that the bankruptcy community is in
desperate need of some type of resolution to this new value debate.
Although LaSalle did not explicitly answer this question, perhaps the
Court's decision said enough to institute an entirely new process in Chapter 11 reorganizations that will no longer focus on the new value doctrine.
Part II of this Note looks at the Court's decision in LaSalle and attempts to
determine how this will affect the future of Chapter 11 cram down
proceedings.
Bonner Mall P'ship v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall
Partnership), 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), vacaturdenied and appealdismissed as
moot, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
66 In re N.LaSalle St. P'ship,126 F.3d at 963-65; Bonner MallP'ship,2 F.3d at
908-09.
67 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Prop., XVIH (In re Bryson Properties, XVMI),
961 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1992).
68Id. at 505.
65

69Id.
70 Coltex

Loop Cent. Three Partners v. BT/SAP Pool C Assocs. (In re Coltex
Loop
Cent. Three Partners), 138 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998).
71
Id. at 44-45.
72

Id.
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II. THE LAS4ALLE DECISION
It is not surprising that the LaSalle decision, anticipated to provide a
final resolution as to whether there is a new value exception or corollary to
the absolute priority rule, has generated substantial criticism.' The
following three sections examine the three opinions within the LaSalle
decision. Justice Souter wrote for the majority of six Justices,74 Justice
Thomas concurred in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia,75 and Justice
Stevens dissented.76
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion began with an in-depth analysis of the pre-Code
origins of the absolute priority rule and new value corollary or exception. 77
The majority then attempted to plow through the drafting history of the
Code, searching for legislative intent concerning codification of the new
value doctrine.78 This would lead one to believe that the Court was
preparing to make a determination as to whether the new value doctrine
remained a viable part of the Code. At the conclusion of this discussion,
however, the Court merely made an observation:
The upshot is that this history does nothing to disparage the possibility
apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute priority rule now on the
books as subsection (b)(2)(BXii) may carry a new value corollary.

I With power comes responsibility, and the Supreme Court shirked its own
when it issued an opinion (a) that had no predicate in the facts before it,
(b) that no one understands and (c) that left the world-or at least the
bankruptcy world-to wonder what a statute means, what it says and, if it
seems to mean what it says, how anyone can satisfy its requirements.
Jonathan Backman, In LaSalle, The Supreme Court Does It Again-Nothing,
BANKR. STRATEGIST, June 1999, at 1,4; see alsoMark A. McDermott, Bankruptcy
Reorganizations:Before andAfter the Supreme Court'sStillbornDecision in 203
North LaSalle, FED. LAw., Aug. 1999, at 22,23 ("Unfortunately for practitioners,
the Court's refusal to decide this issue, along with the Court's cryptic reasoning,
result in a ruling that may be difficult and costly to implement in future cases.').
7
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434,437-58 (1999).
75
Id.at 458-63.
76
1Id. at 463-71.
77 Id.at 444-46.
78Id.at 446-49.
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Although there is no literal reference to "new value" in the phrase "on
account of such junior claim," the phrase could arguably carry such an
implication in modifying the prohibition against receipt by junior
claimants of any interest under aplan while a senior class ofunconsenting
creditors goes less than fully paid.79
Having determined that the history was "equivocal," 80 the Court then
moved on to consider various interpretations of the "on account of"81
modifier.82 First, the Court rejected the Debtor's proposed interpretation of
the phrase as meaning something like "in exchange for" or "in satisfaction
of."83 The Court foundthis interpretationto be too expansive and manipulable.8 4 The Court then rejected the Government's "starchy position 85 that
Congress had intended to categorically exclude pre-petition equity holders
from retaining property under a plan if creditors are not paid in full.86
The Court then discussed a more middle of the road interpretation:
A less absolute statutory prohibition would follow from reading the "on
account of" language as intended to reconcile the two recognized policies
underlying Chapter 11, of preserving going concerns and maximizing
property available to satisfy creditors. Causation between the old equity's
holdings and subsequent property substantial enough to disqualify a plan
would presumably occur on this view of things whenever old equity's
later property would come at a price that failed to provide the greatest
possible addition to the bankruptcy estate, and it would always come at
a price too low when the equity holders obtained or preserved an
ownership interest for less than someone else would have paid.87
After pages of theoretical analysis concerning the viability of each
interpretation, the Court simply shrugged off the issue, stating:
79
80

Id. at 449.
Id. at 448.

8111 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994) (providing that"the holderof any claim

or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under
the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property" (emphasis

added)).
82

LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449-54.
Id. at 449.
8
4 Id. at 450.
8
5Id. at 451.
8
6Id. at 452-53.
" Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
83
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Which of these positions is ultimately entitled to prevail is not to be
decided here ....[The proposed plan] is doomed, we can say without
necessarily exhausting its flaws, by its provision for vesting equity in the
reorganized business in the Debtor's partners without extending an
opportunity to anyone else either to compete for that equity or to propose
8
a competing reorganization plan. 8
The Court then found that the exclusive opportunity to propose a
reorganization plan without extending the opportunity to anyone else to
compete for that equity or propose an alternative plan should be treated as
an item of property.
It is that the exclusiveness of the opportunity, with its protection against
the market's scrutiny of the purchase price by means of competing bids
or even competing plan proposals, renders the partners' right a property
interest extended "on account of" the old equity position and therefore
89
subject to an unpaid senior creditor class's objection.
The remaining portion of the majority's opinion focused on the need
to allow market influences to be the primary indicators as to the value in
the reorganization process. 90 The Court notedthat, by allowing pre-petition
equity holders to have exclusive control over the process of proposing new
value plans, the market is never really tested, and parties cannot determine
the value of the debtor. 91 The Court observed that, "[i]fthe price to be paid
for the equity interest is the best obtainable, old equity does not need the
protection of exclusiveness (unless to trump an equal offer from someone
else); if it is not the best, there is no apparent reason for giving old equity
a bargain."'
The Supreme Court did little to resolve the conflict surrounding the
new value doctrine. It did not take the opportunity to hold that pre-petition
equity holders could never receive an interest in the reorganized debtor, nor
did it expressly find that a new value doctrine exists. It is clear from the
opinion, however, that all new value plans must now be subjected to some
type of market test to avoid the exclusivity problem.93 Unfortunately, the
88Id.
at

454.

89Id.
at 456.

90 Id. at 456-58.
91Id.at 456.
9 Id.

91 Howard Seife & Lois Dix, Bankruptcy New-Value Exception, NAT'L L.J.,
June 21, 1999, atB6.
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specific market test to be employed and the exact process to be followed
were left open by the Court. 4 Therefore, until it is clear as to how the
courts will employ this decision, the economic expectations of borrowers
and creditors will remain in doubt. Part Ill looks specifically at the impact
of removing exclusivity and employing a market test and how this will
affect the creditor in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings.
B. The ConcurringOpinion
Although the concurring opinion agreedwiththe majority's conclusion
that the reorganization plan cannot be confirmed, it did not agree with the
majority's approach to interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. The concurring
opinion called for a straightforward, plain-meaning approach and specifically warned against the inherent danger "in excessive reliance onpre-Code
practice."95
With the use of two common dictionaries only, the two concurring
justices found that the "on account of' phrase was not ambiguous and
refers to some type of causal relationship between junior interest and
property received or retained.96 Therefore:
Regardless [of] how direct the causal nexus must be, the prepetition
equity holders here undoubtedly received at least one form of property-the exclusive opportunity--"on account of"theirprepetition equity
interest. Since § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) prohibits the prepetition equity holders
from receiving "any" property under the plan on account of their junior
interest, this plan was not "fair and equitable" and could not be confirmed." 97
It is also important to note that the concurring opinion referred to the
majority's "speculations about the desirability of a 'market test' "as "dicta
binding neither this Court nor the lower federal courts." 8 These speculations, however, are clearly not dicta because they are incorporated into the
majority's holding. 99

91Lasalle, 526 U.S. at 458 ("Whether a market test would require an
opportunity to offer competing plans or would be satisfied by a right to bid for the
same interest sought by the old equity is a question we do not decide here.").
95 Id. at 462 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., concurring).
97 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
98 d. (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
99 Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 48, at 1479 & n.17.

2000-2001]

DEBTOR EXCLUSIVITY

C. The DissentingOpinion
Justice Stevens rejected the majority's conclusion that the pre-petition
equity holders retained ownership "on account of' their interests in the
debtor, but rather urged an interpretation of § 1 129(b)(2)(B)(ii) that would
permit ajunior claimant to receive or retain interest as long as it was not at
a "bargain price."'"
The dissenting opinion argued that the approval of the plan by the
bankruptcy court was a valuation determination and the court clearly found
that the infusion of capital was at a sufficiently fair price to allow interest
to be retained by the old equity."°' Justice Stevens concluded that the Code
does not impose a requirement for a "market test;" particularly where, as
in this case, the unsecured creditor does not challenge the valuation or
request an auction.) 2
In conclusion, Justice Stevens found that the "exclusive opportunity"
to propose a plan was not a property right, but was only a function of the
Code's creation of an exclusive period during which the debtor may
propose a plan of reorganization.0 3
Although these three opinions take differing views on the correct
Chapter 11 reorganization process, Part IH focuses only on the majority's introduction of the "market test" into the Chapter 11 cram down process.
III. CRAM DowN WITHOUT EXCLUSiVITY WHEN A NEW VALUE
PLAN IS PROPOSED---WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE CREDITOR?

As creditors now enter the Chapter 11 reorganization stage, it will be
difficult to bargain without knowing how the bankruptcy courts will deal
with new value plans. This hinders the process, for the parties will not be
able to adequately gauge their leverage, which in turn will cause a strain on
negotiations and compromise.""' It is clear that the LaSalle decision has
left many questions unanswered. 05 The uncertainty will inevitably gener-

10 LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102
Id.at 467-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 470-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 See, e.g., McDermott, supra note 73, at 26 (stating that "the economic
expectations of borrowers and lenders remain in doubt").
"'I William L. Medford & Patton Boggs, ConductingEquity Auctions Under
LaSalle-The Fog Thickens, AM. BANKR. INsT. J., Oct. 1999, at 20, 20.
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ate higher costs and additional litigation within the reorganization prol 6

cess. 1

The LaSalle decision has significantly changed the way in which
creditors will now have to approach the reorganization process. Upon
entering negotiations, creditors will want to try to project how the
bankruptcy court might answer the questions left open by the Supreme
Court. How will exclusivity be handled? Will the debtor still be able to
exclusively produce a plan during the 120-day period as set out in the
Code, '0 7 or can the creditor seek to terminate exclusivity for cause?"'B In
addition, what market test will the court employ-competing plans,
competing bids, or an auction process? Finally, what will the courts do with
the lingering question whether there is a new value doctrine?
There are really no concrete answers to these questions. The processes
created to deal with the requirements set out by the Supreme Court will
vary from court to court, depending on how each bankruptcy judge reads
and incorporates the LaSalle decision. The remaining portion ofthis Note
attempts to provide some insight into how bankruptcy courts might
approach these difficult questions and how this will affect creditors.
The first portion of this section focuses briefly on pre-LaSallecases"°
that have addressed exclusivity, market testing and the new value debate." 0
The second portion focuses on various proposals that have been suggested
to reform the Code and the effect these proposals might have on the
bargaining position of the creditor,"' The final section focuses on the

[T]he court did not address whether (1)an offer to bid suffices, as opposed
to an actual auction; (2) third parties may bid, or only existing creditors; (3)
an auction must occur if the equity involved is publicly traded; (4) an
auction must occur if the debtor proposes its plan after exclusivity
terminates; and (5) whether the termination of exclusivity suffices if no
creditor files a competing plan.
Id.
" Backman, supranote 73, at 1 ("The Supreme Court's absurd ruling ... turns
an easy issue into a difficult one and ensures not only years of additional litigation,
but millions ofdollars of additional attorney fees with respect to an issue that is not
really an issue at all.").
107 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1994) (allowing debtors an exclusive opportunity to
propose a plan during a 120-day period).
"'lId. § 1121(d) (exclusivity shall be terminated only upon a showing of
"cause").
"oSee infra text accompanying notes 114-39.
"' Medford & Boggs, supra note 105, at 20.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 140-62.
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policies underlying Chapter ll and economic theories in bankruptcy.112 The
section then proposes a process, consistent with the examined theories, for
which creditors should argue when faced with a new value plan proposed
in a cram down."'
A. Pre-LaSalleCase Law
The cases discussed in this section are intended to provide a few
examples ofjudicialtreatment of exclusivity, markettesting, andnewvalue
prior to LaSalle.It is evident upon close examination ofthese cases that the
process of reorganization cram down is significantly different depending
on the court. Therefore, it is important for each creditor to become familiar
with the court and the judge who presides over a given Chapter 11
reorganization. This gives the creditor some indication of what to expect
if the debtor introduces the issue of cram down.
Similar facts to those in LaSalle were present in In re BMW Group I,
Ltd.14 Like the LaSalle Court, The BMW Group court also found the
exclusive purchase right held by the pre-petition equity holders to be in
violation of the absolute priority rule.115 The BMW Group decision,
however, provided a definitive answer to the question whether the new
value doctrine still exists. This court looked only at the plain language in
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and found that there was no "new value exception" to
the "fair and equitable" requirement," 6 but rather that there was a new
value corollary that had to be satisfied." 7 The court explained that this
corollary required only that the price offered by the pre-petition equity
holder be fair."' The court concluded that "there is no valid reason why old
equity should be prohibited per se from purchasing the reorganized
debtor's equity" as long as the market has been tested to ensure that the
highest price is paid." 9 Unfortunately, this court did not discuss any
particular type of market test or how the exclusivity problem should be
resolved.
"2 See

infra text accompanying notes 164-81.
'See infra text accompanying notes 182-90.
"4 In re BMW Group I, Ltd., 168 B.R. 731 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994).
"t Id. at 733, 735.
16 Id. at 734.
117 See id.
118Id.
1191d.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 89

In re HomesteadPartners,Ltd.2 ' incorporated an auction of stock into
the reorganization cram down process to ensure that the entire process
was competitive.'12 The court looked specifically at the plain meaning of
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and found that there was not a "new value exception,"
but rather an invaluable pre-Code corollary that was intended to guide the
application of the absolute priority rule by uncovering the true impetus
behind the old equity group's involvement." The court found that this
"new value corollary" required that the pre-petition equity holders satisfy
the evidentiary burden of proving "necessity" and the reasonable value of
their new capital infusion.' m
The court further explained that without any type of market test, these
requirements would pose an insurmountable evidentiary burden fortheprepetition equity holders. 4 Following this explanation, there was a long
discussion by the court attempting to determine what form of market test
is the most desirable.12 The court ultimately concluded that the debtor was
entitled to the 120-day exclusivity period, but upon confirmation of a new
value plan, the new equity interest must be held out for auction, giving each
creditor the opportunity to compete for control. 2 6 Although this court
answered all questions surrounding new value, exclusivity, and the
appropriate market test, at least one other court found it to be unsatisfactory
and provided other alternatives.'27
Bankruptcy Judge Robert E. Brizendine began his opinion in Condor
One, Inc. v. MoonrakerAssocs. (In re MoonrakerAssocs.),18 by agreeing
with the reasoning and conclusions set forth by Bankruptcy Judge W.
Homer Drake, Jr. in Homestead129 concerning the viability of new value in
120

In re Homestead Partners, Ltd., 197 B.R. 706 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996)

(following the auction process set out inIn reBjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1991)).
121Id.
at 720.
122.

at 713 & n.7.
1d.at 714-15.
12 4 1d. at 715-16.
21Id. at 717-19.
23

Id. at 719. It is important to note that there are some concerns that this
auction process may violate the registration requirements for sales of stock under
the Securities Act of 1933. Id.at 717-18; Medford &Boggs, supranote 105, at 20,
126

31.
127 Condor One, Inc. v. MoonrakerAssocs. (In re MoonrakerAssocs.), 200 B.R.
950, 954 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).

"- Id. at 950.
129
Inre Homestead, 197 BRL at 706.
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relation to the absolute priority rule. 130 Judge Brizendine held that it was
"consistent with congressional intent, that a 'new value' plan is neither an
exception to nor prohibited by Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), but merely raises
the questions of when and under what circumstances such a plan satisfies
the requirements of that provision. '131 It is Judge Drake's answers to the
questions "when and under what circumstances" with which Judge

Brizendine did not agree. 132

Judge Brizendine chose not to accept Judge Drake's ruling that
required an auction or some form of competitive bidding in every instance
in which the debtor in a Chapter 11 proposes a new value plan.133 Judge
Brizedine justified his decision by explaining that such a market test
analysis does not always ensure that the new value plan being presented is
actually offering the maximum value to the estate. 34 Although Judge
Brizendine acknowledged the benefits of a competitive bidding environment to the enforcement of absolute priority, he explained that often this
will not further the goals of obtaining maximum value for the estate, 135 but
rather will upset the "bargaining leverage created by Congress."'136 The
opinion then further explained how creditor bids can often actually distort
37
the true value of the estate by overestimating its value.
Judge Brizendine ultimately proposed that competitive bidding not
be used as a "cure-all" but rather "as a tool that may be used by a court
in reaching its judgment concerning value."'138 In conclusion, the court
found that a debtor should be allowed to make an attempt to propose a
plan that satisfies all material requirements of the Code and should not
be further burdened with the requirement of having to out-bid all
39
creditors.
The opinions in Homesteadand Moonraker illustrate how differently
each judge approaches the questions of new value, exclusivity, and market
testing-even when they are from the same circuit. These opinions follow
130 Inre Moonraker,200 B.R. at 952.
131 Id.

132 Id. at 952, 954 ("To conclude that a purchase option restricted to old equity

is always fatal, in this Court's opinion, is too strict a reading of the requirements
of Section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).").
133 Id. at 954.
134
Id. at 954-55.
135Id.

136Id.at 955.
137Id.
138Id.

131
Id. at 955-56.
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two completely different processes when determining how to handle a
Chapter 11 cram down. These illustrative cases also demonstrate the
difficulty creditors will have in determining how each individual court will
handle post-LaSalle cram downs.
B. Proposalsto Reform the Code
As the cases in the previous section suggest, Chapter 11 cram downs
are riddled with unanswered questions. Bankruptcy judges now face the
difficult task of answering three questions in every Chapter 11 cram down
proceeding. First, is there any need to answer the question whether there is
a new value exception or corollary to the absolute priority rule after the
ruling in LaSalle? Second, when is it necessary to lift exclusivity? Finally,
what is the appropriate market test to use when valuing a reorganizing
debtor?
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission ("the Commission")
was established by Congress through Title VI of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994140 to study and evaluate current bankruptcy law. The most
recent Commission report was issued on October 20, 1997141 and contains
concrete proposals to answer the lingering questions of new value,
exclusivity, and market testing. Of course, there are varying opinions as to
whether these proposals provide the best answers to these lingering
questions,1 42 but they will be used in this section as an alternative framework to generate discussion.
Although this report was issued prior to LaSalle, it may provide some
guidelines that courts can look to when formulating the correct process to
incorporate in order to satisfy the broad requirements of the LaSalle
decision. This section looks at the Commission's proposed answers and
how each will affect the decisions creditors make in bargaining within the
cram down process.
11

National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, 11 U.S.C. prec. § 101 n.
(1994).
141

NATLBANKR.REVIEW COMM'N,BANKRUPTCY: THENEXTTWENTYYEARS,

NATIONALBANKRUPTCYREVIEWCOMMISSIONFINALREPORT (1997), availableat

http://www.nbrc.gov/report/12chaptl.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2001) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT].
142 See, e.g., G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. et al., Review ofthe Proposalsofthe National
Bankruptcy Review Commission Pertainingto Business Bankruptcies:PartOne,
53 Bus. LAW. 1381 (1998).
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1. New Value Exception or Corollaryto the Absolute PriorityRule
The Commission recommends that a new value corollary to the
absolute priority rule be explicitly incorporated into the Code. 43 This
recommendation is based on the belief that it is "economically irrational to
foreclose beneficial equity participation that often can provide a valuable
source of capital to help fund a business reorganization."'" The Commission discusses the importance of a resolution to this debate in fostering a
cram down process that is "balanced, fair, and above all, clear." 45
Unfortunately, the LaSalle decision did not follow this line of thinking
and, instead of providing an answer to this long debated question, focused
on the idea of obtaining fair value by the use of some form of market
testing.' Perhaps the Court will never resolve this debate, since the use of
a market test guards against the ultimate fear that pre-petition equity
holders are obtaining a bargain price for the reorganized debtor.'47 Without
any explicit answer provided by the Supreme Court or a revision to the
Code, it would appear that this debate will continue to be a topic in all new
value reorganizations.
Therefore, some bankruptcy courts after the LaSalle decision may
refuse any objection by a creditor based on the argument that there is no
new value exception or corollary to the absolute priority rule if the new
value plan is subject to some type of market test. In contrast, other courts
may continue to entertain this debate, allowing tremendous amounts of
time and money to go into resolution ofthis threshold question before even
looking at the merits of a case.
As a creditor in this turbulent environment, the best strategy is to try
and determine how the bankruptcy judge might answer this threshold
question, especially in circuits that have not articulated an answer to this
question. Until the Supreme Court says more on the issue, this appears to
be an argument that a creditor should always raise when facing a new value
plan of reorganization.
143 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note

141, § 2.4.15.

144Id.

145
Id.
46

' Bank ofAm. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434, 457-58 (1999).
141See id. at 456 ("If the price to be paid for the equity interest is the best
obtainable, old equity does not need the protection of exclusiveness (unless to
trump an equal offer from someone else); if it is not the best, there is no apparent
reason for giving old equity a bargain.").
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2. Exclusivity andMarket Testing
Not only does the Commission offer a definitive answer to the new
value debate, it also proposes additional changes to the Code to deal with
the issues of exclusivity and market testing. The report recommends that
an addition be made to the current Code that would lift exclusivity when a
debtor seeks to cram down a plan that proposes financing contributions
from pre-petition equity holders. 148 The Commission goes onto explain that
lifting exclusivity would permit other parties to propose plans of reorganization, the best way to accomplish "marketplace validation of value."1 49
The Proposal is designed to maintain the balance between the need for
capital to preserve the business and its going concern value and the need
to increase the certainty that old equity pays a market price for whatever
ownership it buys in the reorganized company.
Practically speaking, when a debtor sought confirmation, the
confirmation process would stop to give any party eligible under section
1121 an opportunity to propose its own plan. The proposing party would
have sufficient time to negotiate, solicit votes, and craft a competing plan.
Through this mechanism, any party in interest who believed that the value
of the enterprise was higher than the equity holders' assessment would
have the opportunity to challenge the valuation in the most concrete way:
the party could seek outside financiers or put up its own money to buy the
equity stake in the business. 50
The Commission stresses the importance of only terminating exclusivity when the debtor affirmatively seeks cram down of a new value plan so
that it does not curtail the opportunity or lessen the incentive for parties to
first make an attempt to construct a consensual plan."' In addition, the
Commission explains that because pre-petition equity holders would no
longer have an exclusive right to bid on the equity in the reorganized
debtor, concerns that retention of a preemptive right to bid for the equity
was property impermissibly retained by the former owners of the debtor
would be alleviated.'5 2

1

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note

149 Id.

141, § 2.4.15.

150 Id.
151 Id.

15
1Id.

(responding to cases likeIn re BMW Group I, Ltd., 168 B.R. 731 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1994) (holding that absolute priority was violated ifpre-petition equity
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The Commission also includes a brief explanation of why competing
plans are more desirable than an auction process or some form of credit
bidding. It observed:
The difficulty with the auction approach is that it divests the court of its
own independent review of the factors required for confimation ofa new
value plan and requires establishing an auction process and reorganization plan format acceptable to the debtor as well as to potential bidders.
The debtor can structure the terms of the auction to advantage old equity.
If no one bids at the auction except the debtor, the debtor's bid is
accepted. Auctions, without more, do not eliminate the possibility of selfdealing.
Creditbidding violates the principle of equality of distribution among
all legally similar creditors. It also undercuts reorganization efforts
because it provides the leverage to a secured creditor, by virtue of its
unsecured portion of debt, to seize any business in which it is not paid in
full.' ,
The Commission's proposal to limit exclusivity and to provide for
competing plans would most likely satisfy the requirements outlined in the
LaSalle decision. The proposal assures that pre-petition equity holders do
not retain any exclusive "property right" to propose a competing plan and,
by incorporating the use of competing bids, the plan will be subjected to
the scrutiny ofthe market. 14 Unfortunately, there is no consensus that this
method of market testing is the appropriate resolution in these situations.
There is some argument that there is no reason to wait to lift exclusivity, but that competing plans should also be proposed during the initial
negotiation process.15 5 This would enhance the process by permitting
parties to place more realistic values on their positions which would in turn
reduce the need for litigation.155 In addition, there is also concern as to
whether creditors will have the ability to obtain sufficient information to
put together a competing plan.' One commentator suggests that creditors
holders
retained exclusive right to propose new value plan)).
53
1 Id.
154 Id.
5 Brunstad

et al., supra note 142, at 1415-16.
1415.
5
I Id at 1418 ("[S]ome suggested that creditors need adequate access to the
debtor's books, records and other information.").
'6 Id. at
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should insist on full and complete access to the debtor's business through
representatives, such as accountants or business consultants, who can
8
evaluate a possible purchase.1
In contrast, there is substantial support behind the use of an auction
process rather than competing plans.'59 In a vast majority of Chapter 11
cases there is no accessible market for the reorganized debtor. 160 There may
not be enough information for third parties to put together a bid, or these
parties may be unwilling to go about the task of assembling a bid when the
only purpose is to test the sufficiency of the contribution offered by the prepetition equity holders.'6 ' Whenthis situation occurs, there is the possibility
that the pre-petition equity holders will be the highest bidders and will
acquire an interest in the reorganized debtor at a bargain price. 162 Obviously, this result would be a violation of the absolute priority rule and an
inadequate market test to produce the results required by the LaSalle
decision.
As a creditor facing these possible outcomes, the best strategy is to be
prepared for everything. At the beginning of any Chapter 11 reorganization,
it will be important for the creditor to understand that if there is a new
value plan proposed, that creditor must be prepared to prove that the
proposed contribution by the pre-petition equity holders is not the actual
value that the market would pay. To prove this, the creditor will have to be
prepared to bid or offer a competing plan that illustrates a higher value. If
the creditor is not interested in acquiring an interest in the reorganized
debtor, third parties should be contacted to generate other prospective
purchasers for the business.
It would appear that if the creditor takes these precautionary steps, the
creditor would be prepared for any process that the bankruptcy judge
decides to employ. Where the creditor merely relies on an objection that
pre-petition equity holders should not be entitled to contribute new value
there is significant risk, as a court may find that after the LaSalle decision
the only requirement to ensure that the absolute priority rule is not violated
is to expose the plan to the market.

M. LOPUCKi, STRATEGIES
PROCEEDINGS 559-60 (3d ed. 1997).
158 LYNN

FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY

"' See, e.g., In re Homestead, 197 B.R. 706, 719 & n.14 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1996); Markell, supra note 10.
"6Brunstad et al., supra note 142, at 1416.
'61 Id, at 1416-17.
62
See LOPUCKI, supranote 158, at 557-58.
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C. Arguments CreditorsShould Make When Facinga New Value Plan
The previous two sections describe the unsettled landscape in Chapter 11 cram downs after the Court's LaSalle decision. 63 Once a creditor
understands this reality, that creditor must then prepare to articulate to the
bankruptcy judge a process to be followed which not only meets the
requirements of LaSalle, but also satisfies the policies underlying Chapter 11.
This section begins with a brief survey of the academic debate
concerning Chapter 11 bankruptcy policy. The discussion will then turn to
the LaSalledecision and the bankruptcy policies articulated in that opinion.
The section concludes with a strategy for creditors to follow when crafting
arguments that will satisfy the policies and procedures mandated by the
Supreme Court in LaSalle.
1. Chapter11 Bankruptcy Policy
There are generally two themes that run through the Chapter 11 policy
debate."' 4 One view derives from an economic perspective ofthe creditor's
bargain, 65 and the other originates from a theory of default distribution
based on varying policy goals. 16
The commentators who follow an economic perspective of the
creditor's bargain are often focused on contractual relationships and
163 See supra notes

140-62 and accompanying text.
'6' Although this Note focuses on these two themes only, it is important for the
reader to understand that there are other policy theories scholars have used to
explain and justify the Chapter 11 process. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New
Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988)
(advocating a new method for division of the reorganization "pie"); Brunstad &
Sigal, supranote 48, at 1475 (advocating the use of a competitive choice theory);
John M. Czametzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate
Reorganizations,67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939 (1999) (using an Austrian economics
model to approach Chapter 11); Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive
Policies and the Limits of the JudicialProcess, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75 (1995)
(asserting that an institutional capability argument is justification for an "investorfocused bankruptcy regime").
165 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CM. L. REv. 815 (1987); Thomas H.
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain,
91 YALE L.. 857 (1982).
166 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775
(1987).
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efficiency. One of these theorists, Professor Baird, asserts that whatever
rights creditors had prior to bankruptcy should continue to be respected
during the reorganization process.' 67 The idea is to respect the rights that
each creditor bargained for in the free market, essentially avoiding any
incentive a party might have to seek bankruptcy only to take advantage of
an alternative distribution scheme. 16 Baird also argues that following this
theory of bankruptcy policy provides guidelines and rules for bankruptcy
judges to follow, which will limit the unbridled discretion that leads to the
16 9
problem of forum shopping.
Professor Warren advocates avery different view ofbankruptcy, which
she describes as a "dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected view.., from
which I can neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily fully articulate
all the factors relevant to a policy decision.""'7 Scholars who advocate this
type of view are often referred to collectively as "traditionalists."'71 As
Warren explains, the economic analysis articulated by Baird is "clear,
straightforward, and always promises to yield firm answers to hard
questions."'" Warren goes on to find fault with this analysis by pointing
out that it only focuses on enhancing the collective return to creditors' 3
while ignoring other distributional issues based on competing interests and
public policy.'74 Under the traditionalist view, the reorganization process
is a forum to weigh and measure the interests and concerns of the debtor,
the creditors and the public, with the bankruptcy judge sitting as an "arbiter
of fairness."' 7
These differing policy views inject another complexity into the Chapter 11 reorganization process. It is likely that since there is a lack of
convergence as to the correct conclusion to this policy question, bankruptcy
judges and practitioners will look to this academic literature when facing
the reorganization of a business in the Chapter 11 process. 76 The reorgani,67 See Baird,supra note 165, at 832.
168 Id.
,69 Id. at 831-32.
171 Warren, supra note 166, at 811.
17, Czaretzky, supra note 164, at 2942.
'" Warren, supranote 166, at 812.
173

Id. at 777.
Id. at 799.

174

'75 Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 48, at 1516.
,,6 See Richard A. Posner, Forewordto CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, at xi-xii (Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss

eds., 1996) (explaining that he thinks this literature will be helpful to bankruptcy
judges and the bankruptcy bar).
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zation process can change drastically depending on the policy view the
bankruptcy judge decides to follow. For example, ifajudge agrees with the
policies asserted by Professor Baird, he or she may feel more restrained in
making value decisions looking only to previously negotiated contractual
relationships. On the other hand, ifthe judge follows Professor Warren's
theories, he or she may feel less restrained in making these value decisions,
taking into consideration not only the debtor-creditor relationships but also
public policy arguments.
It is important to assess theLaSalle decision and examine the majority
opinion to see ifthe Court gave any indication as to the appropriate policy
to be followed when answering difficult distributive questions in a Chapter 11 cram down.
2. Bankruptcy Policy in the LaSalle Decision
In LaSalle the Supreme Court did not come out and resolve the
academic debate concerning the appropriate policy justifications for
Chapter 11 reorganizations, but the Court did provide some indication of
how a bankruptcy judge should handle policy questions when determining
which market test is appropriate in the situation of a cram down.
The Court does little more than require a market test to ensure that prepetition equity holders are not taking advantage of their position by
proposing a plan under which old equity holders are granted the exclusive
opportunityto purchase equity in the reorganized entity.177 The Court states
that "[w]hether a market test would require an opportunity to offer
competing plans or would be satisfied by a right to bid for the same interest
sought by old equity, is a question we do not decide."'"
This question left open by the Court will generate a substantial amount
ofuncertainty for the dissenting creditor. It is likely that bankruptcy judges
will look to the policy arguments outlined in the previous section to
determine which market test is appropriate. Although the Court did not
decide on the appropriate test, it did discuss in some length the preference
for allowing market valuation rather than untested court decisions on
79
valuation.
This statement may justify the economic perspective asserted by
scholars such as Baird. 80 Essentially it would appear as if the Court was
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v, 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526
U.S.7 434,454
(1999).
8
'7

1Id. at 458.

179
Id.at 457-58.

"8 ' See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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attempting to limit the distributional decisions made by bankruptcy judges
and advocated by commentators such as Warren.181 It is unclear if the
decision can be read to support this argument, but it may provide the
dissenting creditor with some supporting authority when forming arguments to present to the bankruptcy court in a cram down situation postLaSalle.The next section focuses on the strategic arguments the dissenting
creditor should make based on bankruptcy policy and the LaSalledecision.
3. StrategicArguments
The arguments developed in this section are based on the assumption
that a new value plan has been proposed by pre-petition equity holders and
the court, following the LaSalle decision, has decided to lift exclusivity to
expose the proposed new value plan to some form of market test. At this
point in the cram down process, it will now be important for the dissenting
creditor to articulate for the court the proper form of market testing which
should be employed to satisfy not only the requirements of the LaSalle
decision, but also sound bankruptcy policy. This will especially be
important in those jurisdictions that have not yet addressed this type of
question.
The creditor should begin by first directing the court to the part of the
LaSalle decision that creates a preference for market testing over the
untested valuation of the bankruptcy judge. 11 2 This seems to encourage a
policy view based on economic factors rather than a theory based on
distribution oflosses caused by default. 183 Although the Supreme Court did
not mandate any particular form of economic market testing, this presumption can be used to support a type of auction process over the use of
competing bids.
At least one commentator finds that with competing plans, "[i]n the
final analysis, the preferences of creditors and shareholders may have less
to do with determining the survivor in the competing-plan arena than the
bankruptcyjudge's independentdeterminationof which plan is the 'best'
choice."' 84 Although bankruptcy courts must look to the statutory require181 See

supra notes 170, 172-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
The author would then encourage the creditor to use the policy arguments
articulated by those scholars who follow an economic perspective based on an idea
of the creditor's bargain. For a brief discussion of this policy, see supra notes 165,
167-69 and accompanying text
Daniel 3.Carragher, A Game ofSurvivor: The Competing-PlanChallenge,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2000, at 14,39 (emphasis added).
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ments in § 1129(c), 9 5 they may still weigh the equities of the situation
related to the probable success ofthe reorganization. 86The court may have
competing plans to choose from in this situation, but it does not always
mean that the bankruptcy judge's decision will replicate the decision in a
competitive market environment. Using this type ofanalysis, the dissenting
creditor would argue that the use of competing plans fails to satisfy the
requirements mandated in LaSalle by incorporating a valuation decision
made by the bankruptcy judge.
An auction process that allows some form of credit bidding is the best
way to satisfy a market value test in a Chapter 11 cram down. 187 The
auction will ensure that market price dominates and will eliminate the
uncertainty surrounding the proof of reorganization value. 88 Allowing
creditors to credit-bid at the auction will preserve the creditors paramount
right to choose the form of their payment.8 9 In addition, the use of creditbidding will equalize the bargaining positions of all parties involved. 9'
This process will not only satisfy the market testing requirements of
LaSalle, but will also limit the valuation determinations made by bankruptcy judges.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the LaSalle decision would appear to leave creditors in
a position of superior bargaining power. Debtors will no longer be able to
propose new value plans that provide a bargain purchase to the pre-petition
equity holders. Rather, the offer of new capital will now have to be tested
to ensure that it is equivalent to the value that the market would pay. This
would seem to ensure that creditors will always be paid the most for their
claims, but there are precautionary steps that the creditor must take to
ensure that this is the case.

"I 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c) (1994). The court must determine whether each of the
plans are confirmable and then compare the plans based on the following factors:
1) type of plan, 2) treatment of creditors and equity holders, 3) feasibility, and 4)
preferences of creditors and equity holders. See In re Holley Garden Apartments,
Ltd., 238 B.R 488,493 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
186 See, e.g., In re Holley, 238 B.R. at 496.
7
..
See In re Homestead Partners, Ltd., 197 B.R. 706,719 & n. 14 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1996).
' See Markell, supra note 10, at 120.
89
' Id. at 121.
190 See id. at 124.
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The creditor must understand that the Chapter 11 reorganization
process may not be consistent from court to court. After the LaSalle
decision, there are many questions left open concerning exclusivity, new
value and market testing. Therefore, the creditor will not be able to predict
the process that will be used to satisfy the requirements set out by the
Supreme Court in LaSalle.
To address this lack of predictability, the most important thing the
creditor will have to do is to prepare to challenge the value that pre-petition
equity holders propose to contribute by offering a competing plan or
bidding for an interest in the reorganized debtor. The creditor may also
want to argue that the proposal does not satisfy the absolute priority rule,
but it is unclear whether courts will even hear these objections after
LaSalle.
Overall, the LaSalle case has generated more questions than answers
and it seems it will be a long time before the fog lifts and the bankruptcy
community receives the answers for which it is looking.

